difficulties faced by banks when selling insurance products by Duyên, Nguyễn Thị Thảo
  
 
 
 
Nguyễn Thị Thảo Duyên 
 
Bancassurance and the new EU Insurance Distribution Directive: 
Difficulties faced by banks when selling insurance products 
 
Dissertation for Master in Law and Financial Markets 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: 
 Professor Margarida Lima Rego. 
 
 
March 2020 
  
PLAGIARISM STATEMENT 
 
I declare on my honour that the work I present is original and that all my citations are 
correctly identified, under article 20-A of the Regulation of the Second cycle of studies 
at NOVA School of Law. I am aware that the use of elements unidentified others 
constitutes a serious ethical and disciplinary fault. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to my advisor Professor 
Margarida Lima Rego for her expert advice and support me during this Master course.  
 
I also would like to deliver special thanks to professors at the Master in Law and 
Financial Markets program for knowledge, skills and especially their enthusiasm and 
kindness helping me to understand well the lectures in Portuguese.  
 
I wish to express my deepest acknowledge to my family for their unconditional support 
and encouragement throughout the lengthy period. Especially, I would like to thank my 
husband, Nguyen Tuan Hung who gives me a chance to study at NOVA University of 
Lisbon and who always spends the best things for me. His unconditional love and 
encouragement that makes me feel stronger. I also would like to thank Ms Nguyen Thi 
Phi Yen, Ms Nhu Hoa Quynh Nga and Mr Nguyen Bin for their encouragement and 
support. 
 
I would like to thank my classmates in NOVA School of Law, especially, Wylian Almeida, 
Belarmino Cardoso, Desidério César, Ana Henriques, Nayda Almeida, Isabelle Gomes, 
Antonio Jorge, Luzolo Manuel, Kátya Caveto, José Lumango, Laura Olival for their warm 
welcome that help me to quickly adapt and feel comfortable with a new environment.  
 
Finally, I would like to thank Ms Patrícia Nascimento and all staffs of Academic Service 
and Library at NOVA School of Law for their enthusiastic assistance during the time I 
study here.  
 
 
 
 
  
RESUMO 
Esta dissertação estuda o impacto da nova Diretiva da Distribuição de Seguros da 
UE (2016/97 / EU, DDS) na bancassurance, que se refere à venda de produtos de 
seguros por instituições bancárias. O principal objetivo é estudar, sob os novos 
requisitos da DDS, quais os desafios legais que os bancos enfrentam na distribuição de 
produtos de seguros. Para esse fim, estudamos os novos requisitos impostos pela DDS 
e comparamos com a anterior Diretiva da Mediação de Seguros (2002/92 / EU, DMS) 
em relação aos seguintes aspetos: requisitos de informação, conduta dos negócios e 
requisitos profissionais e organizacionais. 
Descobrimos que, em geral, em comparação com a DMS, a nova DDS impõe 
requisitos mais rigorosos que os bancos devem cumprir. A DDS restringe as atividades 
de distribuição de seguros através dos bancos, proibindo os bancos de distribuírem 
produtos de seguros sob a forma de mediadores de seguros ligados ou auxiliares. De 
acordo com a nova DDS, os bancos agora são considerados mediadores de seguros e 
devem cumprir todos os importantes requisitos da DDS, incluindo: (i) realização de 
pelo menos 15 horas de formação profissional por ano para os seus funcionários; (ii) 
divulgação aos clientes de informações sobre remuneração (iii) cumprir requisitos de 
supervisão e governança de produtos, em particular, os bancos devem manter e 
organizar uma política de supervisão e governança de produtos ou acordos de 
distribuição de seguros, a fim de garantir que os seus produtos ou a sua distribuição de 
seguros atendam aos melhores interesses dos clientes e (iv) no caso de venda cruzada, 
os bancos devem especificar as necessidades e exigências dos clientes em relação aos 
produtos de seguros e oferecer aos clientes a capacidade de comprar produtos de 
seguros e outros produtos separadamente. Particularmente para os produtos de 
seguros baseados em investimentos (IBIPs), os bancos devem: i) fornecer aos clientes 
mais informações, incluindo relatório periódico de avaliação da adequação dos IBIPs, 
uma declaração de adequação e relatório periódico sobre a distribuição dos IBIPs; ii) 
estabelecer uma política de conflitos de interesse, (iii) avaliar os incentivo ou esquemas 
de incentivo; e (iv) avaliar a adequação ou inadequação dos IBIPs. 
Palavras-chave: Bancassurance, Diretiva da Distribuição de Seguros, Insurance 
Mediation Directive. 
  
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation studies the impact of the new EU Insurance Distribution Directive 
(2016/97/EU, IDD) on the bancassurance which is referred to the selling of insurance 
products by banking institutions. The main objective is to study under the new 
requirements of the IDD what legal challenges banks will face in distributing insurance 
products. To this end, we study the new requirements imposed in the IDD and compare 
with the previous Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EU, IMD) with respect to 
the following aspects: requirements on information, the conduct of business, and 
professional and organisational requirements.  
We found that, in general, in comparison with the IMD, the new IDD places stricter 
requirements that banks must comply with. The IDD tightens the activities of insurance 
distribution through banks by prohibiting banks distributing insurance products 
under the form of tied or ancillary insurance intermediaries. Under the new IDD, banks 
are now considered as insurance intermediaries and must comply fully important 
IDD’s requirements, including: (i) conducting at least 15 hours of professional training 
per year for their employees, (ii) disclosing customers with information concerning 
remuneration in relation to insurance contracts, (iii) conducting requirements of 
product oversight and governance, in particular, banks must maintain and arrange 
whether a products oversight and governance policy or insurance distribution 
arrangements in order to ensure that their insurance products or their insurance 
distribution will meet the best interest of customers, and (iv) in the case of cross-
selling, banks must specify the demands and needs of customers in relation to 
insurance products, and offering customers the ability of buying insurance products 
and other products separately. Particularly, for insurance-based investment products 
(IBIPs), banks must i) provide customers with more information, including periodic 
report of assessment of the suitability of IBIPs, a suitability statement, and periodic 
report concerning distribution of IBIPs, ii) establish a conflicts of interest policy, (iii) 
assess inducement or inducement scheme, and (iv) assess the suitability or 
appropriateness of IBIPs.  
Keywords: Bancassurance, Insurance Distribution Directive, Insurance Mediation 
Directive. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Bancassurance is an arrangement between a bank and an insurance company that 
allows the insurance company to sell its products to the bank's client base. This 
partnership arrangement can be profitable for both companies. Banks earn additional 
revenue by selling insurance products, and insurance companies expand their 
customer bases without increasing their sales force or paying agent and broker 
commissions.  
Although bancassurance can benefit both banks and insurance companies, it has 
been developed differently in the world. In Europe, bancassurance has been developed 
since the 1980s and has been a major distribution channel of life insurance products in 
some mature insurance markets, such as France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. However, 
bancassurance has been not been received much attention in Canada.1 On the other 
hand, bancassurance has gained a great interest in some countries in Asia-Pacific, the 
Middle East, Africa and Latin America.2 Especially, for developing countries, 
bancassurance is considered as a valuable tool of insurance distribution and becoming 
the second distribution channel of life insurance products followed by insurance 
agents. Experts in the insurance and financial market believe that bancassurance will 
keep developing and gaining more market shares in such countries, such as Vietnam.  
However, in the legal aspect, there exist some issues that arise in the context of 
selling insurance products through bancassurance. For instance, minimum deal term 
or exclusivity; authorisation; customer ownership and privacy, miss-selling exposure; 
risk-free and profit-related income; pricing, product and underwriting flexibility; 
                                                        
1Lyle Adriano (2018), IBAC commends separation of banking and insurance, Insurance Business Canada, 
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/ca/news/breaking-news/ibac-commends-separation-of-
banking-and-insurance-106278.aspx 
2 Swiss RE (2007), ‘Bancassurance: Emerging Trends, Opportunities and Challenges’, Sigma, no. 5/2007. 
Zurich: Swiss Reinsurance Company, Economic Research & Consulting, p.411.  
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investment in infrastructure; and contractual flexibility.3 In addition, banks were 
known as the main reason leading to the global financial crisis in 2008.4 In the context 
of strengthening customer protection in the financial industry sector, this raises a 
question of whether the activity of insurance distribution through banks should be 
strictly and differently regulated from other insurance intermediaries. To answer this 
question, we look into Europe that is in the second largest global insurance market.5 
Europe is also the place bancassurance has the longest journey of formation and 
development with great success.6 
Since 2008, the European Union has changed some important regulations on the 
insurance sector. Especially, the Solvency Directive II (2009/138/EC)7 and the 
Insurance Distribution Directive (2016/97/EU)8 (IDD) was issued in 2009 and 2016, 
respectively. On 1st October 2018, the European Member States completed the 
implementation of the IDD. The IDD officially replaced the Insurance Mediation 
Directive (2002/92/EU)9 (IMD).  This arises a question of how the new regulations in 
the new IDD impact on the activity of insurance distribution in Europe in general and 
bancassurance activities in specific. The main concern is whether the European 
Commission will treat banks stricter than other insurance intermediaries.  
                                                        
3 Martin Membery and Sean Keyvan (2014), The global bancassurance market, Sidley Austin LLP, p. 29-
31, https://www.sidley.com/~/media/files/publications/2014/06/the-global-bancassurance-
market/files/view-article/fileattachment/1406-sidley-austin.pdf.  
4 Wikipedia, Financial crisis 2007-2008, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308.  
5European Insurance-Key Facts (2019), p.7, 
https://www.insuranceeurope.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/European%20insurance%20%E2
%80%94%20Key%20facts.pdf 
6 This can be seen in part 2.5 of chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
7 In full: Directive (EU) 2009/138 of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 November 2009 on 
the taking-up and pursuit of the business of insurance and reinsurance (hereinafter referred to as 
Solvency II) 
8 In full: Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 of January 2016 on 
Insurance Distribution (hereinafter referred to as IDD) 
9 In full: Directive (EU) 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 December 2002 on 
insurance mediation (hereinafter referred to as IMD). 
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Motivated by the above considerations, this dissertation discusses the changes in 
the new European Directive on insurance distribution of bancassurance operators, 
especially of banks. The main objective of this research studies whether banks in 
Europe might face any difficulties in selling insurance products under the new 
regulations. To this end, the dissertation will analyse and compare important 
requirements stated in the IMD and the IDD for banks on insurance distribution in 
Europe. In addition, the dissertation will compare the IDD’s requirements for banks 
with other insurance distributors.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
bancassurance in Europe. First, the chapter introduces the basic definitions of 
bancassurance and discussing the advantages and disadvantages that bancassurance 
brings to insurers and bankers. Then, to understand the core principle of 
bancassurance and how bancassurance works, the dissertation studies the common 
bancassurance models that have developed in Europe, as well as their advantages and 
disadvantages. Next, we discuss popular bancassurance products based on the link 
between insurance and banking products. We also study the recent development of 
bancassurance in Europe through analysing data and information collected by 
European Insurance.10 The last part of this chapter introduces generally the European 
regulatory framework on bancassurance including the relevant Directives on the 
banking and insurance sector, for instance, the Capital Requirement Directive IV 
(2013/36/EU)11, the Financial Conglomerates Directive (2002/87/EC)12, the Solvency 
                                                        
10 Insurance Europe is the European Insurance and Reinsurance Federation. Through its 37 member 
bodies — the national insurance associations — Insurance Europe represents all types of insurance and 
reinsurance undertakings, eg pan -European companies, monolines, mutuals and SMEs. 
https://www.insuranceeurope.eu/about-us.  
11 In full: Directive (EU) 2013/36/EU of the European and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to 
the activity of credit institution and the prudential supervision of credit and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC 
12 In full: Directive (EU) 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment 
firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 
92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council.  
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Directive II, and the IDD to understand how bancassurance operators have been 
regulated in Europe.  
Chapter 3 presents an insightful overview of the two recent important the European 
regulations on insurance distribution, namely, the IMD and the IDD. The chapter aims 
to have a general picture of the IMD and the IDD. In particular, it highlights the new 
provisions in the IDD to understand what are the main differences between the two 
Directives.  To this end, firstly, we analyse the main requirements of the IMD and its 
limitations. Then, we will only focus on the new provisions of the IDD to understand 
how the IDD changes the activity of insurance distribution in Europe.  
Chapter 4 studies further how the IDD’s provisions affect directly to the insurance 
distribution activity of banks in Europe. This chapter focus on analysing the scope of 
the IDD, the rules on cross-selling, the professional and organisation requirements, the 
product oversight and governance, and the additional requirements concerning 
insurance-based investment products. The last part of the chapter indicates the 
important changes for the insurance distribution activities of banks.  
Chapter 5 concludes under the new Directive, whether or not the banks might face 
more difficulties when distributing insurance products. 
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CHAPTER 2: BANCASSURANCE IN EUROPE 
2.1 The principle concepts of bancassurance: 
The term of bancassurance was originated from France and is used to indicate the 
simple distribution of insurance products through bank branches. Although the use of 
this term was started from the mid-1980s until now there is no formal and common 
legal definition of bancassurance.13 Consequently, the bancassurance concepts differ 
from one observer to another.  
Some of the bancassurance definitions focus solely on distribution and cross-selling 
of insurance products in between banks and insurance companies, such as: 
 “Bancassurance refers primarily to banks entering the insurance sector by 
offering insurance products to their retail customers”.14 
 “Bancassurance is the process of using a bank’s customer relationships to 
sell life and non-life insurance products.”15 
 “It is generally considered as encompassing the partnership or 
relationship between a bank, acting as an insurance agent or broker, and 
an insurance undertaking whereby the insurance undertaking uses the 
bank sales channel (namely, bank branches) to help drive the sale of 
products supplied by an insurer.’’16 
While other definitions underline the integration of banks and insurance companies 
in a single entity: 
                                                        
13EIOPA (2017), The Report on Evaluation of the Structure of Insurance Intermediaries Markets in Europe, 
p.12. 
14Tobias C. Hoschaka (1994), Bancassurance, p.1. 
15 Serap O. Gonulal, Nick Goulder, Rodney Lester, Bancassurance: A Valuable Tool for Developing 
Insurance in Emerging Markets, Policy Research Working Paper 6196, The World Bank - Financial and 
Private Sector Development Non-Bank Financial Institutions, 2012, p.2 
16 EIOPA (2018), The Report on Evaluation of the Structure of Insurance Intermediaries Markets in Europe, 
p.12. 
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 “Bancassurance is the provision of and selling of banking and insurance 
products by the same organisation under the same roof.’’17 
 “It is a business strategy – most initiated by banks – that aims at 
associating banking and insurance activities within the same group, with 
a view to offer these services to common customers who, today, are mainly 
personal customers.”18 
And finally, other broader definitions realise both the interlinkages of different 
financial services and distribution of these products.  
 “As a rule, bancassurance can be described as a strategy adopted by banks 
or insurance companies aiming to operate the financial market in a more 
or less integrated manner. In practice, the term ‘bancassurance’ is 
consistently used to describe a new strategic orientation of financial 
institutions in private customer business.’’19 
 “In France, the word ‘bancassurance’ refers to credit institutions which 
have created an insurance activity.’’20 
The bancassurance concepts stated above reflect the different degrees of integration 
of insurers and bankers that can vary from a simple distribution model to some types 
of a capital link between the two activities.21  
2.2 Bancassurance models: 
Banks and insurance companies can cooperate in many different models to conduct 
insurance business. The main two variables that distinguish the cooperation form are 
the percentage of financial ownership and the level of integration from strategies and 
                                                        
17 Elkington, W., Bancassurance, Chanered Building Societies Institute Journal, March 1993, 2-3, p.2 
18 Tribune de l'Assurance, Bancassurance Les Conquerants, hors serie, Paris, 1993, p.6 
19 Swiss Re, Bancassurance, No.2, Sigma, 1992, p.4. 
20 Yanick Bonnet and Pierre Arnal (2000), Analysis and prospects of the French bancassurance market, 
p.3. 
21 Nadege genetary and Philip Molyneux, Bancassurance, 1st ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 1998, p.10. 
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management perspective.22 In the next follows we will discuss the most popular 
models adopted for the cooperation of the bank and insurance company in Europe, 
namely, partnership, joint venture, and captive.23  
2.2.1 Partnership: 
A partnership also called as a cross-selling arrangement in the literature is a formal 
arrangement by two or more parties to manage and operate a business and share its 
profits.24 Among the three models, the partnership is the simplest one in which a bank 
plays the role of an insurance intermediary that is similar to insurance agents or 
brokers. Through its branches, the bank sells insurance products for one or more 
insurance companies. In return, the insurance companies pay selling commissions or 
fees to the bank.  
 
                        
 
  
Diagram 1.1 The partnership (cross-selling) model. 
2.2.2 Joint venture: 
In general, a joint venture model is one kind of cooperation between independent 
partners in the literature, is a business arrangement in which two or more parties agree 
to pool their resources to establish a “joint venture company” to conduct a specific task. 
                                                        
22 Davis, S.I. (2007) ‘Bancassurance: The Lessons of Global Experience in Banking and Insurance 
Collaboration’, VRL Knowledge Bank Ltd 
23 Massimo Caratelli, The Bancassurance Market in Europe, in Bancassurance in Europe: Past, Present and 
Future, Franca Fiordelisi, Ornella Ricci (ed.), 2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p.71. 
24 Investopedia, Partnership, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/partnership.asp. 
Insurance company Distribution agreement Bank 
Shares customer base 
           Pays commission/ frees 
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A specific task can be a new project or other business activities that all parties are 
interested in. In this model, each participant is responsible for profits, losses and costs 
associated with it. However, the venture company is its owns entity, separate from the 
participants’ other business interest.25 In the context of bancassurance, the joint 
venture is the result of the cooperation of a bank and an insurance company to 
constitute a new entity that is devoted to a bancassurance business. The venture 
company distributes insurance products only through the network of its banking 
parent.26 In return, the joint venture company pay the distribution commissions and 
benefits from dividends to the bank. 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1.2. A bank and an insurance company constitute a new entity in the joint 
venture. 
2.2.3 Captive model: 
In the captive model, the banking and the insurance activities are under the 
direction of a common owner. There are two possible cases that are illustrated in 
Diagram 1.3.  In the first case, a bank establishes an insurance company as a subsidiary 
to realise an insurance business, or acquires a majority of an insurance company 
already operating on the market, with share ownership typically very high, often 100 
per cent. The banking parent can control fully the insurance business and use the 
information at its disposal, designing products suitable for well-known customer's 
                                                        
25 Investopedia, Joint Venture¸ https://www.investopedia.com/terms/j/jointventure.asp, August 2019.  
26 Mark Teunissen (2008), Bancassurance: Tapping into the Banking Strength, The Geneva Papers, 33, p.2 
Insurance company Bank 
New insurance company 
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needs and avoiding the danger of new insurance products take sales away from the 
older insurance products (cannibalization).27 In the second structure, the same holding 
company owns a bank and an insurance company with different levels of integration 
that are either a unique strategic design or little effort to coordinate the two activities.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1.3. The different integration between banks and insurance companies in 
the captive model. 
2.2.4 The advantages and disadvantages of the bancassurance models: 
In practice, there is no country in which bancassurance relied on a single form.29 The 
specific socioeconomic, cultural and regulatory environment of the host country, as 
well as of the market framework and consumer preferences that are main factors affect 
the choice of the bancassurance models.30 Furthermore, the major advantages and 
                                                        
27 Berghendal, G. (1995), The Profitability of Bancassurance for European Banks, International Journal of 
Bank Marketing, XIII, 1, p. 27. 
28 Massimo Caratelli (2012), The Bancassurance Market in Europe, in Bancassurance in Europe: Past, 
Present and Future, Franca Fiordelisi, Ornella Ricci (ed.), p.20 and p.87. 
29 Same book, p. 84. 
30 Same book, p. 84. 
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disadvantages of each bancassurance model are bases for bankers and insurers to 
choose sufficient structures that are briefly presented in Table 1.1: 
Table 1.1: The main advantages and disadvantages of alternative bancassurance 
models. 
The models Advantage Disadvantage. 
Cross-selling 
agreement 
 Quick, simple and 
reversible. 
 Provision of basic products. 
 Partners remain 
independent. 
 Limited exploitation of 
synergies. 
  Possible conflicts of interest. 
Cooperation 
between 
independent 
partners 
 Enhancement of specific 
competences. 
 Possibly clashing cultures 
    Partners remain 
independent. 
 Problems of coordination 
and value sharing. 
Control by 
ownership. 
 Unique strategic design.  Long term capital 
commitment. 
 The maximum potential 
for synergies. 
 Complexity and agency 
problems. 
Source: Franca Fiordelisi, Ornella Ricci (ed.), Bancassurance in Europe: Past, Present 
and Future, 2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p.2 
2.3 The advantages and disadvantages of bancassurance: 
Bancassurance can be profitable for both banks and insurance companies. Banks 
earn additional revenue from broadening of products, while insurance companies can 
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approach potential customers without expanding their sale forces or pay commission 
to insurance agents or brokers. Additionally, banks and insurance companies can 
obtain the following attractive benefits, see Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2: The benefits of bancassurance for banks and insurance companies: 31  
Banks Insurance companies 
 Have an additional and stable source 
of incomes, reduce banks' 
dependence on the interest margin; 
 Access to banks’ client database, 
usually more consistent; 
 
 Expand the potential client portfolio;   Reduce dependence on agents or 
brokers; 
 Diversify the range of products and 
service as a manner of increasing the 
client's loyalty; 
 Share certain categories of services 
with the banks; 
 Reduce the capital requirement 
(compared to the undertaken risks) 
at the same level of incomes; 
 Increase efficiency in the 
development of new products in 
partnership with the banks; 
 Access to the funds of the life 
insurers, including for reasons of a 
fiscal nature. 
 Quick access to new markets without 
being necessary to have their 
distribution network; 
  Obtain capital to increase solvency 
and to develop the business. 
                                                        
31 Wong, C., Cheung, L. (2002), Bancassurance development in Asia – shifting into a higher gear, Sigma No. 
7/2002, Swiss Re. p.3-38. 
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However, the cooperation between banks and insurance companies to sell 
insurance products can rise the typical risks that are related to specific aspects of 
bancassurance activities. One of the most obvious risk that is banking staff lack 
sufficient knowledge about insurance products. Some insurance products, especially 
non-life insurance, are more complex and very different from banking products. 
Meanwhile, banking staffs are trained to mainly distribute banking products rather 
than insurance products. This risk can lead the customer to buy insurance products 
that are inappropriate with the customer’s demands and needs. In addition, there are 
other risks that are shown in the following list:32  
 Investment risk in the bancassurance without a subsequent increase in 
revenues from this activity. 
 Risk of losing a good brand. 
 Risk of customer relationship management and the customer’s needs 
identification. 
 Risk of financial settlements between the cooperation entities.  
 Risk of substitutability and complementarity of the products offered under 
bancassurance. 
 Risk of solvency and liquidity loss as well as risk transfer, liquidity and 
solvency problems between cooperating banks and insurers. 
 Risk of extensive competition between distribution channels. 
 Risk of lack of acceptance for the bancassurance model by employees of 
cooperating companies.  
2.4 Bancassurance products: 
Bancassurance products are insurance products distributed by banks, as tied with 
banking products or standalone products. In general, a bancassurance product 
                                                        
32 D. Szewieczek (2013), The risk of cooperation between banks and insurance companies, Studia 
Eknomiczne, 127, p. 147. 
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includes can be classified as low insurance content and high insurance content. A 
bancassurance product has high insurance content if it belongs to the non-life business. 
This type of product provides protection to the insured against unexpected events, 
such as accidents, disablement, critical illness, or unemployment. On the other hand, 
bancassurance product with low insurance content is also known as life insurances 
with investment elements. This type of insurance product plays a role as a saving 
product that is capable of providing the insured a return in the form of (i) reserve in 
the cases of death, life, surrender, or (ii) the transformation of the accumulated funds 
into annuities. 
 Based on the link between banking products and insurance content, bancassurance 
products can be divided into three main groups, including (i) products are directly 
linked to banking products; (ii) products are packaged with banking products, and (iii) 
products are non-bank-related.33 They are discussed as follows.  
The first type of insurance products is similar to the asset management service of 
banking products, for example, life assurance, traditional policies, or complimentary 
with banking products such as payment protection policies. Life assurance and 
traditional policies are the ones that satisfy the investment or pensions needs of 
customers with a high-saving and low-insurance content.34 The policies normally 
provide a life or death coverage and pay-out guaranteed amount at the end of the policy 
according to the conditions set out in the contract. However, there are main differences 
between the asset management of life assurance and traditional policies. For life 
assurance, based on the usage of the premium pool and the value of policies depends 
on whether the performance of funds or share index, the life insurance assurance 
products can be formed as unit-linked or index-linked policies. Unit-linked life policies 
are policies in which their premium pool will be managed as (i) investment funds that 
are trusted by investment firms, or (ii) internal funds that are managed by insurance 
                                                        
33 Maria Grazia Starita (2012), Bancassurance products, in Bancassurance in Europe: Past, Present and 
Future, Franco Fiordelisi and Ornella Ricci (ed.), p.42. 
34 Same book p.27. 
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companies and the value of the unit-linked policies will depend on the performance of 
such funds. Whereas, index-linked life policies are policies that their value is linked to 
the performance of financial markets, particularly, a share index. For the traditional 
policies, these bancassurance products are directly linked with-profit funds that are 
managed by the smoothing policy and the assignment of a series of regular bonuses. 
Particularly, insurance companies try to avoid changes in the size of the bonuses from 
one year to the next. Therefore, they hold back some of the profits from good years to 
boost the profit in bad years.35   
On the other hand, payment protection insurance is considered as products that are 
directly linked to banking products. Although this product does have a similar 
assessment service with banking products as life assurance or traditional policies, it is 
complimentary with banking products. Particularly, payment protection insurance 
ensures repayment of a credit that can be offered by a bank in the case of the insured 
dies, becomes ill or disabled, lose a job, or faces other circumstances, thus it may 
prevent the insured from earning income to service the debt.36  
The second is that packaged with banking products. Typical examples of this type of 
product include car insurance or home insurance. Thanks to their restricted insurance 
content, these products can provide a basic cover and linked with a banking account or 
mortgage. Particularly, car insurance provides linked with a banking account,37 
whereas home insurance can be packaged with a mortgage.38  
The last is bancassurance products that are non-bank-related products, such as 
travel insurance, health insurance, and pet insurance. In comparison with life 
assurance or traditional policies, these bancassurance products have high-insurance 
contents. However, the same with car insurance or home insurance, these non-bank-
                                                        
35 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/With-profits_policy 
36 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Payment_protection_insurance 
37 Maria Grazia Starita (2012), Bancassurance Products, in Bancassurance in Europe: Past, Present and 
Future, Franco Fiordelisi and Ornella Ricci (ed.), p.46. 
38 Same book, p.45. 
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related products have restricted insurance content, thus, banks can offer their 
customers such products linked their banking account. 
2.5 The development of bancassurance in Europe: 
Bancassurance was developed originally in France. The French law 1984 early 
allowed credit institutions to widen their activities, banks thereby have been able to 
carry out activities related to the insurance sector.39 The bancassurance development 
into three different periods: up to 1980, during the 1980s, and the 1990s.40  
Before 1980, banks started extending their activities by providing insurance 
guarantees which were linked to banks' activities rather than insurance, for instance, 
credit insurance for consumer credit and other loans (in France), building insurance 
and contents insurance for a mortgage (in Great Britain), insurances coverage for thefts 
at the point of withdrawals (in Italy). 
After the 1980s, saving products were benefited from advantageous tax regimes and 
classified as life insurance products. The bank provided life insurance products with a 
saving function, such as annuity policies, endowments contracts.  
Around the 1990s, the bank started providing insurance products linked to 
investment funds, pure life insurance and whole-life insurance policies. Figure 1.1 
shows that during a decade from 1990 to 2000, the proportion of premium of life 
insurance distributed through banks in France increased continually and reached 61 
per cent in 2000 
                                                        
39 C. Blot, J. Creel, A. Delatte, F. Labondance, and S. Levasseur (2014), Structure evaluations and reforms 
of the French banking and financial system since the 1980s: Relationship with the legal process of European 
integration, Working Paper Series, No 66, Journal of Economic Literature, p. 9.  
40 Daniel, J.P. (1995,) Les Enjeux de la Bancassurance (Paris: Edition de Verneuil). 
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Figure 1.1. The premium of life insurance products distributed by banks in France from 
1990 to 2000 (%). 
Data Source: from French Insurance Federation.41 
In recent years, bancassurance is still a major distribution channel of life insurance 
in some European countries, whereas, for the distribution of non-life insurance 
products, it is less common.42 Figure 1.2 shows that, in 2016, the Gross Writing 
Premium (GWP) of life bancassurance which accounted for more than 60 per cent, for 
instance, Turkey (83 per cent), Malta (82 per cent), Italy (76 per cent), Portugal (71 per 
cent), and France (65 per cent) whilst, the proportion of the GWP was less than 20 per 
cent. In the term of bancassurance products, unit-linked policies are the largest written 
contracts in many markets, with a penetration rate reaching more than 50 per cent in 
Italy, Belgium and France,43 meanwhile, property insurance has observed penetration 
                                                        
41 Y. Bonnet, P. Arnal (2002), Analysis and prospects of French bancassurance market, p.2. 
42 EIOPA (2018), Insurance Distribution Directive - Evaluation of the Structure of Insurance 
Intermediaries Markets in Europe, Luxembourg Publications Office of the European Union, p.12. 
43 Massimo Caratelli (2012), The Bancassurance Market in Europe, in Bancassurance in Europe: Past, 
Present and Future, Franca Fiordelisi, Ornella Ricci (ed.), p.62. 
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rates higher than in the other non-life sectors for the majority of the European 
markets.44  
 
                                                        
44 Massimo Caratelli (2012), The Bancassurance Market in Europe, in Bancassurance in Europe: Past, 
Present and Future, Franca Fiordelisi, Ornella Ricci (ed.), p.62. 
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Figure 1.2. The proportion of the gross written premium (GWP) of life and non-life 
insurance distribution channels in Europe, 2016. 
Source: Insurance Europe45. https://www.insuranceeurope.eu/insurancedata 
From the data mentioned above, bancassurance has developed differently among 
European countries. In Western Europe, bancassurance has been an important 
distribution channel for life insurance products, and it is now a growing vehicle for the 
non-life sector (Figure 1.3). In contract, in many Central and Eastern European 
countries, the share markets of bancassurance do not exceed 40 per cent for life 
insurance, and 10 per cent for non-life insurance, for instance, two of the largest 
                                                        
45 Insurance Europe is the European insurance and reinsurance federation. Through its 37 member 
bodies — the national insurance associations — Insurance Europe represents all types of insurance and 
reinsurance undertakings, eg pan-European companies, monolines, mutuals and SMEs. 
https://www.insuranceeurope.eu/about-us 
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European insurance markets that are Germany and the United Kingdom. To 
understand this, we can use three significant reasons indicated by Gilles Benoist:46 
 The first and most important is the differences in legislative and regulatory 
standards. 
 Significant differences in tax systems and the structure of pension systems. For 
example, in France, life insurance products are very similar to banking products 
and also qualify for tax incentives. This makes them easy to sell insurance 
products by banking networks; 
 Differences in the role of banks in the financial system. Bancassurance has made 
the biggest inroads into the market in countries where the banks play a 
significant role in the financial system, such as in Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands. Meanwhile, bancassurers have a smaller market share in those 
countries where everything revolves around the stock market, such as the 
United Kingdom.  
In addition, the figures mentioned above show that bancassurance has been more 
typical and successful with life insurance than non-life insurance. The key reason is 
that life insurance products are easy to commercialize for banks’ sales personnel 
because of its similarity to investment and savings contracts provided by banks.47 
Furthermore, life instruments, for example, unit-linked policies, are also frequently 
guaranteed and supported by favourable tax treatment to encourage private provision 
for protection or retirement planning.48 Nevertheless, figure 1.3 shows that 
bancassurance is developing constantly not only for life insurance but also for the non-
life sector.  
                                                        
46 Gilles Benoist (2002), Bancassurance: The New Challenges, The Geneva Paper on Risk and Insurance. 
Issues and Practice, Vol.27, No.3, pp. 296-303, p.297. 
47 Massimo Caratelli (2012), The Bancassurance Market in Europe, in Bancassurance in Europe: Past, 
Present and Future, Franca Fiordelisi, Ornella Ricci (ed.), p.65. 
48 Same book, p.65. 
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Figure 1.3. The proportion of the premium of life and non-life insurance distributed 
through bancassurance channel in Europe, 2011 and 2016. Data Source: European 
Insurance in Figure, 201449 and 201950. 
                                                        
49 Insurance Europe (February 2014), Statistics No 48 European Insurance in Figure, 
p.61, http://www.biztositasiszemle.hu/files/201402/european-insurance-in-figures-
2.pdf. 
50 The data available: https://www.insuranceeurope.eu/insurancedata 
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2.6 The recent European Insurance and Banking Regulatory Framework 
concerning Bancassurance: 
2.6.1 The Capital Directive: 
The opportunity to develop the bancassurance model was offered by the Second 
Banking Directive (89/646/EEC)51 which removed the existing barriers between 
different sectors of the financial services industry so that a credit institution can 
become a distribution channel of financial and insurance services.52 (Cranton 2000) At 
the moment, the rules on the activities of bank and banking prudential requirements 
are regulated by the Capital Requirement Directive IV.53 
2.6.2 The Financial Conglomerate Directive: 
In the captive model of bancassurance, banks and insurance companies can be 
controlled by the same holding company. This integration of two sectors known as 
financial conglomerates which are financial groups including credit institutions, 
insurance undertakings and investment firms which provide services and products in 
different sectors of the financial markets.54 The Financial Conglomerates Directive 
(2002/87/ECC) regulates financial activities of banks and insurance companies in 
financial conglomerates.55 In particular, the Directive lays down rules for 
                                                        
51 In full: The Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provision relating up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
52 Ross Cranton (2002), Principles of Banking Law, p. 32. 
53 Article 1 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC.  
54 Recital (2), Directive (EU) 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment 
firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 
92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. 
55 Recital (5) of Directive (EU) 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and 
investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 
79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
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supplementary supervisory on European financial conglomerates, such as solvency, 
risk concentration and intra-group transaction. The Directive was adopted on 16 
December 2002, applied from 11 February 2003. European Union countries had to 
incorporate into national law by 10 August 2004. On 16 November 2011, it is amended 
by Directive 2011/89/EU. 56   
2.6.3 The Solvency Directives: 
Solvency Directives lay down rules on the taking-up the business of insurance and 
reinsurance. The first Directive on Solvency (73/239/EEC) was adopted on 24 July 
1973 and then it was repealed by the Solvency Directive II.  The second Solvency 
Directive was amended by the Directive 2014/51/EU57 and became fully applicable to 
European insurers and reinsurers on 1 January 201658. The Solvency Directive II 
introduces a harmonised, sound and robust prudential framework for insurance firms 
in the European Union.59 The Directive primarily provides the minimum capital 
requirement including a minimum amount and a standard formula for the calculation 
of solvency capital that European insurance and reinsurance companies must hold to 
reduce the risk of insolvency; establishes requirements for governance and 
supervision for risk management; and details requirements for disclosure and 
transparency.60 Under the Directive, European insurers and reinsurers now comply 
with a higher capital requirement to permit timely intervention61; submit to supervisor 
                                                        
56 Article 2, Directive 2011/89/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Directive 98/78/EC, 2002/87/EC and 2009/138/EC regards the supplementary supervision 
of financial entities in a financial conglomerate. 
57 Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2014/51/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 16 April 2014 
amending Directive 2003/71/EC and 2009/138/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 
1096/2010 in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and 
Markets Authority). 
58 Article 2(83), Directive (EU) 2014/51/EU.  
59 European Commission, Solvency II Overview – Frequently asked questions. 
60 Recital (65), Recital (70), and Article 129 of the Solvency II.  
61 Article 17(2), Directive 73/239/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 July 1973 on the 
coordination of laws regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of 
the business of direct insurance other than life assurance; and Article 129 (1, d) Solvency II.  
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authorities the necessary information for supervision62, and disclose some information 
to the public63. 
2.6.4 The Insurance Distribution Directive: 
The rules for the taking-up and pursuit of the activities of insurance and reinsurance 
mediation regulated by the Insurance Mediation Directive (IMD) which was adopted 
on 9 December 2002, then amended by the Market in Financial Instrument Directive 
(2014/65/EU)64 (MiFID II). However, since 1 October 2018, the activities of insurance 
and reinsurance distribution in the European Union has been regulated on the 
Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD). To enhance the single European insurance 
market and guarantee the highest level of customer protection, the IDD covers not only 
insurance undertakings or intermediaries but also other market participants who sell 
insurance products on an ancillary basis.65  Under the IDD, insurance distributors must 
comply with additional requirements on information, organisation and disclosure.  In 
addition, the European Commission also issued several regulations supplementing the 
specific provisions of the IDD: 
 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2358 of 21 September 2017 
supplementing Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council with regard to product oversight and governance requirements for 
insurance undertakings and insurance distributors (Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2358); 
 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359 of 21 September 2017 
supplementing Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council with regard to information requirement and conduct of business rules 
                                                        
62 Article 35 of the Solvency II. 
63 Section 3, Chapter IV of the Solvency II. 
64  In full: Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets 
in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU. (hereinafter 
referred as to MiFID II). 
65 Recital (8) of the IDD. 
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applicable to the distribution of insurance-based investment products. 
(Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359). 
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CHAPTER 3: THE NEW EU INSURANCE DISTRIBUTION DIRECTIVE 
3.1 Introduction to the Insurance Mediation Directive: 
For a long time, insurance intermediaries have been playing an important role in the 
distribution of insurance products.66  However,  in Europe, until the appearance of 
Insurance Mediation Directive (IMD, 2002), there was still substantial differences 
between European Member States’ provision on regulating the activities of insurance 
and reinsurance intermediaries.67 Thus, IMD aims to introduce a single passport in 
which the insurance intermediaries can be easier to offer cross-border services or 
establish a branch operation; enhance the customer protection at European level; and 
establish good cooperation between the competent authorities of the home and host 
Member States.68 The IMD was fully into force on 14 January 2005 and repealed the 
Insurance Agents and Brokers Directive (77/92/EEC).69  
The IMD laid down the rules for the taking-up and pursuit of the activities of 
insurance mediation by a natural and legal person which are established or wish to 
become established in a Member State.70 The Directive aims to guarantee not only the 
freedom of insurance intermediaries to establish and provide services but also the 
equality of treatment between operators and customer protection requires.71 The IMD 
set down significant requirements on registration, professional and information for 
insurance intermediaries. 
                                                        
66 Recital (1) of the IMD. 
67 Recital (5) of the IMD. 
68 CEIOP (2007), Report on the Implementation of the Insurance Mediation Directive’s Key Provisions, p.3.  
69 In full: Directive 77/92/EEC of 13 December 1976 on measures to facilitate the effective exercise of 
freedom to establish and freedom to provide services in respect of the activities of insurance agents and 
brokers. 
70 Article 1(1) of the IMD. 
71 Recital (6) and Recital (9) of the IMD. 
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3.2 The scope of the Insurance Mediation Directive: 
The Insurance Mediation Directive (IMD) regulates insurance mediation activities 
carried out by insurance intermediaries and tied insurance intermediaries. In 
particular, insurance intermediary is any natural or legal person, for remuneration, 
taking up or pursuing the following insurance mediation activities:72 
 Introducing, proposing or carrying out other work preparatory to the 
conclusion of contracts of insurance, or of concluding insurance contracts, or 
 Assisting in the administration and performance of insurance contracts, in 
particular in the event of a claim.  
A tied insurance intermediary can be defined as follows: 73 
 A person who carries out the activity of insurance mediation for and behalf 
of one or more insurance undertaking in the case that insurance products are 
not in competition. However, this person does not collect premiums or 
amounts intended for the customer and acts under the full responsibility of 
the insurance undertakings for insurance products which concern them 
respectively.  
 A person who carries out the activity of insurance mediation in addition to 
his or her principal professional activity if the insurance is complementary to 
the goods or services supplied in the framework of this principal professional 
activity. In addition, this person does not collect premiums or the amount 
intended for the customer. 
Additionally, the IMD excluded the following activities which are not considered as 
the insurance mediations:74  
                                                        
72 Point (3) and (5), Article 2 of the IMD 
73 Article 2(7) of the IMD. 
74 Article 2(4) of the IMD. 
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 Insurance undertakings or employees who act under the responsibility of 
insurance undertakings carry out the insurance mediations; 
 The provision of information of professional activity that is not to assist the 
customer in concluding or performing an insurance contract; 
  The management of claims of an insurance undertaking on a professional 
basis, and loss adjusting and expert appraisal of claims. 
Furthermore, the IMD does not apply to the persons who carry out the insurance 
mediation activities for an insurance contract that meets all the following conditions: 
 The insurance contract only requires knowledge of the insurance cover that 
is provided; 
 The insurance contract is not a life insurance contract; 
 The insurance contract does not cover any liability risks; 
 The principal professional activity of the person is other than insurance 
mediation; 
 The insurance is complementary to the product or service supplied by any 
provider and such insurance covers: (1) the risk of breakdown, loss of or 
damage to goods supplied by that provider, or (2) damage to or loss of 
baggage and other risks linked to the travel booked with that provider, even 
if the insurance covers life assurance or liability risks, provided that the 
cover is ancillary to the main cover for the risks linked to that travel.  
 The amount of the annual premium does not exceed EUR 500 and the total 
duration of the insurance contract, including any renewal, does not exceed 
five years.  
3.3 The main requirements of the Insurance Mediation Directive: 
3.3.1 Registration requirements: 
Insurance intermediary and tied insurance intermediary must register with a 
competent authority of its home Member States when carrying out the activity of 
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insurance mediation within the Community.75 In particular, insurance undertakings or 
associations of insurance undertakings must take responsibility to register for tied 
insurance intermediaries. The IMD did not apply registration requirements for natural 
persons who work in insurance undertakings and pursue the insurance mediation 
activities.76  
Under the IMD, the Member States established more than one register for insurance 
intermediaries. The Member States also established a single information point that 
provides the identification details of competent authorities of each Member States. 
This single information is compiled electronically and kept updated that allows 
insurance intermediaries to access information quickly and easily from these various 
registers.77 
3.3.2 Professional requirements: 
The professional requirements include (i) the requirements on appropriate 
knowledge and ability concerning insurance products; (ii) a good repute; (iii) the 
professional indemnity insurance, and (iv) necessary measures on protecting the 
customer against the inability of insurance intermediary in transferring a premium and 
claim money between undertakings and the customers.  
The IMD requires insurance undertakings to verify the knowledge and ability of 
insurance intermediaries if the principal professional activity of the insurance 
intermediaries is not the insurance mediation.78 Furthermore, if necessary, the 
insurance undertakings need to provide those intermediaries with a training on 
insurance products.79 Persons work in insurance undertakings, especially, (i) who are 
responsible for the mediation of insurance products, and (ii) who are directly involved 
                                                        
75 Article 3(1) of the IMD. 
76 Article 3(1) of the IMD. 
77 Article 3(2) of the IMD. 
78 Para. 2, Article 4(1) of the IMD. 
79 Para. 3, Article 4(1) of the IMD.  
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in the insurance mediation must demonstrate their knowledge and ability necessary 
for the performance of their duties.80  
Insurance intermediaries must be a good repute. This means that they must have a 
clean police record regarding serious criminal offences that are linked to (i) crimes 
against property or other crimes related to financial activities and (ii) should not have 
previously been declared bankrupt unless the insurance intermediary is rehabilitated 
under national law.81 Besides, the insurance intermediaries must hold (i) the 
professional indemnity insurance that covers the whole territory of the Community or 
(ii) some other comparable guarantee against liability arising from professional 
negligence.82  
Furthermore, the IMD stipulates necessary measures to protect customers against 
the inability of insurance intermediaries regarding (i) the transfer of the premium to 
insurance undertakings or (ii) the transfer of the amount of claim or return premium 
to the insured. In particular, money that are paid by a customer to an insurance 
intermediary must be treated as having been paid to an insurance undertaking. 
Secondly, money that are paid by the insurance undertaking to the insurance 
intermediary must be not treated as having been paid to the customer until the 
customer receives them. The money of the customers are transferred via strictly 
segregated client accounts and these accounts are not used to reimburse other 
creditors in the event of bankruptcy. Furthermore, the insurance intermediaries are 
required to have a financial capacity amounting permanently.83  
                                                        
80 Para. 4, Article 4(1) of the IMD. 
81 Para. 1, Article 4(2) of the IMD. 
82 Article 4(3) of the IMD. 
83 Article 12(4) of the IMD. 
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3.3.3 Information requirements: 
Prior to the conclusion of any specific contract, insurance intermediaries must 
provide to their customers with the following information: 
 The identity and address; 
 The register; 
 The information concerning the ownership between the insurance 
intermediaries and undertakings; 
 The procedures enabling customers and other interested parties to register the 
complaint and the out-of-court complaint and information on redress 
procedure.  
In addition, the insurance intermediaries also inform the customers whether: 
 They will advise the basic of a fair analysis of a sufficiently large number of 
insurance contracts available on the market; 
 They are under or not under a contractual obligation to conduct insurance 
mediation business exclusively with one or more insurance undertakings.  In 
this case, if customers require, the insurance intermediaries must provide the 
name of those insurance undertakings.84   
The IMD requires the insurance intermediaries to specify the demands and needs of 
customers. Regarding requirements on advice, the insurance intermediaries must 
provide the customer with the underlying reasons for any advice on a given insurance 
product. 
3.3.4 Insurance-based investment products: 
On 12 May 2014, the Market in Financial Instrument Directive II (MiFID II) was 
adopted and it amended the IMD regarding insurance-based investment products 
(IBIPs). The MiFID II provides the definition of IBIPs. According to that, the IBIPs means 
                                                        
84 Article 12(1) of the IMD. 
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that insurance products (i) offer a maturity or surrender value that is wholly or 
partially exposed, directly or indirectly, to market fluctuations and (ii) do not include 
non-life insurance products, life insurance contracts only cover death, injury, sickness 
or infirmity, pension products, occupational pension schemes, and individual pension 
products. 85 
Furthermore, the IMD includes additional requirements to protect customers who 
buy IBIPs. Firstly, an insurance intermediary or undertaking must act honestly, fairly 
and professionally following the best interest of its customers. All information and 
marketing communication thereby shall be fair, clear, and not misleading. Secondly, to 
prevent conflicts of interests, the insurance intermediary or undertaking must 
maintain and operate effective organisation and administrative arrangements by 
taking all appropriate steps to identify the conflicts of interest between (i) their 
managers and employees, or any person directly or indirectly linked to them by 
control, and (ii) their customers or between one customer and another.86 If the 
arrangements are insufficient, the insurance intermediary or undertaking must 
disclose customers the general nature or source of the conflicts of interest before 
undertaking business.   
3.4 Reasons to revise the Insurance Mediation Directive: 
Finance turbulence from the global financial crisis in 2008 had raised the need of 
protecting customer’s benefits across all financial sectors.87 In November 2010, the 
G20, an international forum for the governments and central bank governors from 19 
countries and the European Union, asked the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the Financial Stability Board, and other relevant services to 
strengthen the customer protection. The G20 underlined the need for proper 
regulation, supervision of all financial service providers, and agents that deal directly 
                                                        
85 Point (b), Article 91(1) of the MiFID II. 
86 Article 91(2) of the MiFID II. 
87 Point 1 of Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance 
Mediation (recast) /* COM/2012/0360 final - 2012/0175 (COD) */. 
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with consumers.88 This organisation also provided principles in which customers 
should always benefit from comparable standards of customer protection. Therefore, 
in order to ensure an adequate level of customer protection across the EU, the 
European regulation concerning insurance distribution should be more uniform,89 and 
the IMD need to be reviewed along the line of these guideline and international 
initiatives.  
On the other hand, revising the IMD aims to make it more appropriate with the new 
EU Directive regarding insurance. In particular, during the discussion in the European 
Parliament on the Solvency Directive II, adopted in 2009, a specific request was made 
to review the IDM. Some members of the Parliament and some consumer organisations 
considered that (i) there was a need for a further improvement in policyholder 
protection and (ii) in selling practices for different insurance products. Especially, 
some strong concerns have been raised regarding the standards for the sale of life 
insurance products with investment elements. To ensure cross-sectoral consistency, 
the European Parliament requested that the revision of the IMD should meet the same 
consumer protection standards as mentioned in the MiFID II. 
In March 2007, the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors (CEIOPS)90 published a report indicating that there was a need for 
clarification on some terminology used in the IMD. In addition, some of the IMD's 
requirements were impractical from day-to-day supervision. The CEIOPS also intended 
to make suggestions for amending the IMD and the Luxembourg Protocol to (i) improve 
the regulation of cross-border services, and (ii) enhance consistent supervision of 
                                                        
88 Point 1 of Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance 
Mediation (recast) /* COM/2012/0360 final - 2012/0175 (COD) */. 
89 Recital (10) of the IDD.  
90 On January 2010, the CEOPS was replaced by the European Insurance and Occupational Pension 
Authority (EIOPA) by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority, amending Decision 716/2009/EC 
and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC. 
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insurance intermediaries and for other amendments.91 Furthermore, in 2012, the 
CEIOPS published a consultation document on the review of the IMD. The consulation 
indicated the following key limitations of the IDM and key problems on insurance 
distribution that the revised IMD must focus on addressing:92 
 Firstly, the information provided to customers is dense, legalistic, full of jargon, 
and difficult to digest. The information given to customer varies significantly 
that depends on the insurance products and the prevailing regulatory 
requirements on insurance mediation of the Member States. Furthermore, 
customers are not always fully informed about their rights during the process 
of insurance mediation. This might lead to unsuitable advice and miss-buying 
and mis-selling of products that potentially generate relevant regulatory issues. 
Notably, the third generation of insurance directives (recast under the Solvency 
II), the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) and the Distance Marking of 
Financial Service Directive (2002/65/EC) contain overlapping requirements in 
the area of pre-contractual information because of their different purposes and 
scopes. This could cause increase the administrative burden for the national 
supervisory authorities, insurance intermediaries, insurance undertakings and 
consumers. 
 Secondly, rules on conflicts of interests and transparency of the IMD are unclear 
and insufficiently effective to prevent policyholders who buy unsuitable and 
overpriced products and less competitive markets. Article 12 contained a 
mixture of disclosure and conflicts of interest provisions that might lead to 
confusions. The IMD does not contain any provision on remunerations; and 
therefore, the Member States were free to impose their remuneration 
requirements on sellers of insurance products. Furthermore, the conduct of 
business and the attitudes to the application of general good rules in insurance 
                                                        
91 CEIOPS (2007), Report on the implementation of the Insurance Mediation Directive's key provisions, 
p.25. 
92 CEIOPS (2012), Consultation Document on the Review of the Insurance Mediation Directive, Commission 
Staff Working Paper, pp.4-6. 
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intermediation diverge among the Member States. The IMD had not been 
completed its goal to create a Single Market for insurance intermediaries.  
 Thirdly, the definition of the IMD’s scope is unclear; and this leads to diverging 
interpretations concerning exemptions from the scope. The definition of 
insurance intermediation that was built on the activity-based principle seemed 
to conflict with the definition of the IMD and the whole set of related provisions. 
The IMD did not guarantee a real level playing field between all participants 
involved in the selling of insurance products, because it directly exempts 
insurance undertakings and their employees from its scope. Consequently, 
policyholders might receive less information and protection when directly 
buying insurance products from insurance undertakings. In addition, to 
guarantee a level playing field of all participant in the selling insurance products 
and to achieve effective consumer protection, it was also important to consider 
the current exemption for insurance intermediaries providing information to 
business customers in the large risks area. 
 Finally, notification system of the IMD was burdensome and does not encourage 
cross-border insurance intermediaries. This directly narrowed the available 
choices of consumers and impacted negatively on the competitiveness of the 
insurance markets, the level of administrative burden and the final cost for 
consumers. The Commission services reconignise this problem and request 
further improvements, modernisation and increased transparency.  
3.5 Introduction to the Insurance Distribution Directive:  
The Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) is a revised version of IMD, where the 
former has a wider scope.  After the process of revising in a four-year, the IDD was 
addopted on 2 February 2016. However, since 1 October 2018, the IDD has been 
entering in force and repealed the IMD. The main IDD’s objectives are to ensure that 
customers can benefit from the same level of protection that applies when they buy 
insurance products from different distribution channels, and to strengthen further the 
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internal market and promote a true market for life and non-life products and 
services.93 Therefore, the Directive inherits the main regulations of the IMD and 
introduces new provisions in order to fix the IMD’s limitations. 
3.6. A wider scope and new definitions:  
The IDD applies to any natural or legal persons who take up and pursue the activities 
of insurance distribution in the EU, particularly, insurance undertakings, insurance 
intermediaries, and ancillary insurance intermediaries.94 The IDD states that the 
insurance intermediaries are not the insurance undertakings or the ancillary insurance 
intermediaries; thus, the IDD provides clearer definition of the insurance 
intermediaries than the IMD.   
The IDD replaces the definition of insurance mediation by the insurance 
distribution. As a consequence, the insurance mediation activities that were covered 
under the IMD are replaced by new ones, including advising and assisting activities 
through the website and other media. According to the new IDD, the insurance 
distribution implies that:95  
 The activitiy of advising, proposing, or other work that are preparatory to the 
conclusion of contracts of insurance, of concluding such contracts; 
 The activities of assisting in the administration and performance of such 
contract. In particular, in the event of a claim, including the provision of 
information concerning one or more insurance contracts in accordance with 
criteria selected by customers through a website or other media and the 
compilation of an insurance product ranking list, including price and product 
comparison, or discount on the price of an insurance contract, when the 
                                                        
93 Recital (6) and Recital (9) of the IDD. 
94 Article 1(1,2) of the IDD. 
95 Article 2(1) of the IDD. 
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customer can directly or indirectly conclude an insurance contract using a 
website or other media.  
Furthermore, the IDD adds new two activities which are not considered to 
constitute the insurance distribution:96 
 The mere provision of data and information on potential policyholders to 
insurance intermediaries and undertakings where the provider does not take 
any additional steps to assist in the conclusion of an insurance contract.  
 The mere provision of information about insurance products, an insurance 
intermediary, an insurance undertaking to potential policyholders where the 
provider does not take any additional steps to assist in the conclusion of an 
insurance or reinsurance contract.  
 
The IDD regulates the insurance distribution activities of insurance distributors 
who are insurance intermediaries, ancillary insurance intermediaries, and insurance 
undertakings.97 According to the IDD, an insurance intermediary can be any natural or 
legal person but must posses to the following characteristics: (i) he or she takes-up and 
pursues the activity of insurance distribution for remuneration, and (ii) is other than 
whether insurance undertaking98 or the insurance undertaking’s employees, or an 
ancillary insurance intermediary. 99  
Ancillary insurance intermediary is refered as a natural person or a legal person, 
other than a credit institution or an investment firm100, who for remuneration, takes 
up or pursue the activity of insurance distribution on the ancillary basis and satisfies 
the following conditions: 
 His/her principal professional activity  is other than insurance distribution; 
                                                        
96 Article 2(2) of the IDD. 
97 Article 2(8) of the IDD. 
98 As defined in Article13(1,4) of the Solvency II.  
99 Article 2(3) of the IDD. 
100 As defined in points (1) and (4) of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
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 She or he only distributes insurance products that are complementary to goods 
or services.  
 The insurance products he or she distributes do not cover life assurance or 
liability risks, unless these insurance products are (i) considered as 
complementary products with the goods or services, and (ii) provided as the 
principal professional activity of ancillary insurance intermediaries.  
Notably, any ancillary insurance intermediaries who meet the following conditions 
will be excluded from the obligation of full compliance to the IDD's requirements:101  
 If they provide insurance products that cover the risk of breakdown, loss of, or 
damage to, the good or the non-use of the service; or damage to, or loss of, 
baggage and other risks linked to travel;  
 The amount of the premium paid for the insurance products provided by the 
ancillary insurance intermediaries does not exceed EUR 600 - the ammount is 
calculated on a pro-rate annual basis; 
 In the circumstances where the insurance product is complementary to the 
service and the duration of that service is equal to, or less than, three months, 
the amount of the premium paid per person does not exceed EUR 200. 
 
However,  insurance undertaking or intermediary who distributes its products 
through the ancillary insurance intermediaries stated above must comply with the 
following the IDD’s requirements:102 
 They must provide customers with their identity and address and the 
information of the complaint procedure in which the customers and other 
interested parties can register complaints about insurance distributors; 
 They must ensure appropriate and proportionate arrangements to comply 
with the general principle on providing information, rules on cross-selling, and 
                                                        
101 Article 1(3) of the IDD. 
102 Article 1(4) of the IDD.  
  
 
 
38 
 
to consider the demands and needs of the customer before the proposal of the 
contract; 
 They must provide the customers with the insurance product information 
document  
3.7 The main new requirements of the Insurance Distribution Directive: 
 3.7.1 Registration requirements: 
The IDD also sets down a condition for the registration of insurance distribution 
activities. According to this condition, an insurance intermediary or an ancillary 
insurance intermediary must provide its authority competent of home Member State 
the following information:103 
 The identities of shareholders or members who hold at least 10 per cent in the 
intermediaries, and the amounts of those holdings; 
 The identities of persons who have close links with the intermediary; 
 Information that those holdings or close links do not prevent the effective 
exercise of the supervisory functions of the competent authority.  
 
A part from the information mentioned above, when insurance distributors 
establish a branch or a permanent presence within territory of another Member State 
in the first time, they must communicate with and provide their home Member State 
with information regarding the host Member State and their insurance distribution 
activity.104 
According to the IDD, insurance intermediaries and ancillary insurance 
intermediaries must register insurance distribution activity. Insurance undertakings 
who distribute insurance products directly do not need to register their activity of 
insurance distribution. However, insurance undertakings must register and ensure the 
                                                        
103 Article 3(6) of the IDD.  
104 Article 6(1) of the IDD. 
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conditions for an insurance intermediary or an ancillary insurance intermediary who 
acts under their responsibility.105 Insurance intermediaries now can distribute their 
insurance products through an ancillary insurance intermediary. The insurance 
intermediaries must register and ensure that the ancillary insurance intermediary 
comply with the requirements of the IDD.106 It is important to stress that this is a new 
point of the IDD because under the IMD only insurance undertakings can use insurance 
intermediaries or tied insurance intermediaries to sell their insurance products. 
Under the IDD, the registration procedure of the insurance distribution activity 
becomes more transparent and convenient for insurance distributors. Specifically, the 
IDD requires Member States to establish an online registration system that is easily to 
access and allows the registration form to be completed directly online.107 Along with 
that, the EIOPA establishes and publishes on its website, and keep up-to-date a single 
electronic register that contain records. These records include information concerning 
insurance and ancillary insurance intermediaries who have noticed their intention to 
carry on cross-border business.108 Additionally, the EIOPA establishes a website with 
hyperlinks of each single information point or, where applicable, register, established 
by the Member States.109 Especially, the IDD lays down cases where the competent 
authority can refuse the registration of insurance distributor that was not specified 
under the IMD.110  
The registration requirement is an important obligation that insurance distributors 
must comply with. If insurance distributors breach this obligation, the IDD requires 
competent authorities of Member States to apply administrative sanctions, including 
(i) issuing an order requiring the insurance distributors to cease the conduct and to 
                                                        
105 Article 3(1) of the IDD. 
106 Article 3(1) of the IDD. 
107 Article 3(2) of the IDD. 
108 Article 3(4) of the IDD. 
109 Article 3(4) of the IDD. 
110 Article 3(7) of the IDD. 
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desist from a repetition of the conduct and (ii) withdrawing the registration of 
insurance intermediaries and ancillary insurance intermediaries.111 
3.7.2 Professional and organisation requirements: 
To ensure insurance distributors and their employees possess appropriate 
knowledge and ability of insurance distribution activities, the IDD stipulates three 
main requirements including (1) continuing professional training and development 
requirements; (2) verifying the knowledge and ability in the line with the particular 
activity of insurance distributor and the products distributed; and (3) demonstrating 
the knowledge and ability concerning insurance products and insurance distribution. 
According to the IDD, ancillary insurance intermediaries must comply with fewer the 
IDD’s professional requirements, in comparison with insurance undertakings and 
intermediaries. 
Under the new IDD, employees of insurance undertakings and intermediaries are 
required to have at least 15 hours training per year. The contents of the training include 
the nature of the products sold, the type of distributor, the role they perform, and the 
activity carried out within the insurance distributor. The successful completion of the 
training can be proven by a given certificate.112 However, the training  requirements 
will not apply for employees of ancillary insurance intermediaries. Therefore, 
insurance undertakings or intermediaries will verify the knowledge and ability of 
ancillary insurance intermediaries act under their responsibility.113 
Furthermore, the training requiremnets will not apply for all the natural persons 
who work in insurance undertakings or intermediaries. These persons include (i) the 
relevant persons within the management structure of the insurance undertakings who 
are responsible for distribution, and (ii) those are directly involved in insurance 
distribution. However, these persons must demonstrate their professional knowledge 
                                                        
111 Article 32(1) of the IDD. 
112 Para. 3, Article 10(2) of the IDD. 
113 Para. 4, Article 10 (2) of the IDD. 
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and ability necessary for the performance of their duties. The IDD specifies the 
minimum professional knowledge and competence concerning life insurance, non-life 
insurance, and investment-based insurance products. Furthermore, insurance 
undertakings must establish, maintain, and keep up-to-date records of all the 
documentation concerning professional requirements.114 
Finally, the IDD increases the amount of professional indemnity insurance and 
financial capacity. That is, insurance undertakings or intermediaries must hold at least 
EUR 1.25 million for each claim, and in aggregate EUR 1.85 million per year for all 
claims. For the financial capacity, they must hold at least EUR 18.75 thousand. Whereas, 
ancillary insurance intermediaries comply with particular regulations of Member 
States.115 
3.7.3 Information requirements and conduct of business rules: 
a. New general principle and general information: 
The IDD sets down a general principle in providing information, and other 
important rules for conducts of insurance business that include the rule of cross-
selling, and the standards for non-advice sales. The information provided to a customer 
can be divided into the general information and the information concerning conflicts 
of interest and transparency.   
Regarding to the general principle on providing information, insurance distributors 
must act honestly, fairly, and professionally following the best interest of the customer. 
In addition, all information provided to the customer must be fair, clear and not 
misleading. Marketing communications must be identifiable. Insurance distribution 
must not conflict with a customer's interest, particularly, the insurance distributors 
must not allow to make any arrangement by way of remuneration and sales targets.116  
                                                        
114 Article 10(8) of the IDD. 
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116 Article17 of the IDD. 
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According to the IDD, in a good time prior to concluding an insurance contract, 
insurance distributors must provide different general information to their customers. 
In comparison with the IMD, insurance must provide customer with the following 
additional disclosures:117 
 insurance distributors must inform customers whether it is an insurance 
intermediary or an insurance undertaking or an ancillary insurance 
intermediary.  
 Insurance undertaking and the intermediary must inform customers 
whether they provide advice about the insurance products sold.  
 Insurance intermediary must notify the customer whether it is representing 
the customer or is acting for and on behalf of the insurance undertaking. 
b. New disclosure requirements on information concerning conflicts of interest and 
transparency: 
According to the IDD, prior to concluding an insurance contract, insurance 
intermediaries must provide customers with the following additional information: 
 The nature of remuneration is associated with the insurance contract.118  
 The working basis of the insurance contract, particularly, whether the 
contract works based on fees or commission or another type of remuneration 
or combination of those remunerations;119  
 In the case that the fee is payable directly by customers, the insurance 
intermediaries must inform the customers the amount of the fee or, if that is 
not possible, the method for calculating the fee.120 
 
                                                        
117 Article 18 of the IDD. 
118 Point (d) of Article 19(1) and Article19(4) of the IDD. 
119 Point (e) of Article 19(1) of the IDD. 
120 Article 19(2) of the IDD. 
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Furthermore, insurance intermediaries and undertakings must disclose information 
of any payments other than the ongoing premiums and scheduled payments that are 
made by customers under an insurance contract after its conclusion.121 However, for 
ancillary insurance intermediaries, they must only disclose the nature of remuneration 
in relation to an insurance contract.  
c.  New standards for advice and sales where no advice is given: 
The IDD requires insurance distributors (i) to ensure that a contract proposed must 
be consistent with the demands and needs of customers, and (ii) to provide the 
customers with a standard insurance product information document of a non-life 
insurance product.122 When providing an advice to customers, insurance distributors 
also must provide a personalised recommendation explaining why a particular 
product would best meet the customer’s demands and needs. 
d. Information conditions: 
The new IDD also regulates the means of providing information; that includes 
through out printed papers, durable medium, and websites. Specificly, the IDD adds 
conditions regarding the use of durable medium and websites. According to these 
conditions, insurance distributors must ensure that the use of a durable medium or a 
website must be appropriate in the context of the business conducted between them 
and their customers. Additionally, for the durable medium, insurance distributors must 
ensure that they are given to customers a free choice of getting information via paper 
or a durable medium, and customers decides to choose the latter. Whereas, if the 
information is provided through websites, insurance distributors must comply with 
the following additional conditions:  
 The customer has consented that the information is provided through websites; 
                                                        
121 Article 19(3) of the IDD. 
122 Article 20(6, 7, 8), IDD. 
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 The customer has been notified electronically of the address of websites, and 
the place on the websites where that information can be accessed; 
 The cusomers can access information on the website whenever they need to 
consult it for certain reasons. 
Furthermore, if customers require, insurance distributors must provide the 
customers, without fees, printed copies of the general information123, the information 
concerning the conflicts of interest and transparency124, and the insurance product 
information document125 that are already given through a durable medium or a 
website.126 
Finally, if insurance distributors fail to comply with the conduct of business 
requirement concerning any insurance products other than the IBIPs, then competent 
authorities of Member States must issue an order requiring insurance distributors to 
cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of the conduct and withdraw the 
registration of insurance distributors.127 
3.7.4 New additional requirements concerning IBIPs:  
The additional requirements concerning IBIPs were mentioned in the MiFID II that 
amended the IMD in 2014. The IDD retains the definition of IBIPs and the main 
requirements concerning conflicts of interests. Furthermore, the IDD provides new 
requirements relating to the disclosure of conflicts of interest, the additional 
information, reporting to customers, especially, assessment of the suitability and 
appropriateness of IBIPs. In addition, if insurance distributors fail to comply with the 
conduct of business requirements concerning IBIPs, then a competent authority of 
                                                        
123 Referred to Article 18 of the IDD.  
124 Referred to Article 19 of the IDD.  
125 Referred to Article 20 of the IDD.  
126 Article 23(3) of the IDD. 
127 Article 32(1) of the IDD. 
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Member States must apply administrative sanctions and the maximum administrative 
pecuniary sanction.128 
a. Conflicts of interest: 
The disclosure of conflicts of interest: According to the IDD, the disclosure includes 
sufficient details to enable customers to make an informed decision concerning the 
insurance distribution activities in the context of which the conflict of interest arises.129 
Particularly, the disclosure must (i) provide a specific description of the conflict of 
interest in question; (ii) explain the general nature and sources of the conflict of 
interest; (iii) explain the risk to the consumer that arise as a result of the conflict of 
interest and the steps undertaken to mitigate those risks; and (iv) clearly state that the 
organisational and administrative arrangements are not sufficient to ensure that risk 
of damage to interests of the customer will be prevented.130  
An effective organisation and administrative arrangements: The IDD specifies 
requirements regarding an effective organisation and administrative arrangements. 
Insurance undertakings and intermediaries must ensure that the arrangements are 
proportionate to the activities performed, the insurance products sold, and the type of 
distribution.131 Specificly, they must establish, implement, and maintain conflicts of 
interest policy. In addition, they must assess inducement or inducement scheme.  
The conflicts of interest policy must be set out in writing and include (i) references 
to the specific insurance distribution activities carried out, the circumstances which 
constitute or may rise to a conflict of interest that are entailled a risk of damage to the 
interests of one or more customers and, (ii) procedures and measures to manage 
conflicts and to prevent them from damaging the interest of the customers. 132 
                                                        
128 Article 32(2) of the IDD. 
129 Article 28(2) of the IDD. 
130 Article 6(2) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359. 
131 Article 27 of the IDD. 
132 Article 4(2) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359. 
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Insurance undertakings and intermediaries must assess and periodically review, on a 
basis at least annually basis, the conflicts of interest policy, and take all appropriate 
measures to address deficiencies.133 
In addition, insurance intermediaries and undertakings must keep and regularly 
update a record of the situations in which (i) the conflicts of interest entailing a risk of 
damage to the interest of a customer has arisen or, (ii) in the case of ongoing service or 
activity may arise. Senior manager of the insurance intermediaries or undertakings 
must receive written reports on that situations, at least annually.  
Insurance intermediaries and undertakings must assess inducement or inducement 
scheme whether it has a detrimental impact on the quality of the relevant service to 
the customer by performing overall analysis including the relevant factors which may 
increase or decrease the risk of detrimental impact on the quality of the relevant 
service to the customer, and any organisational measures taken by insurance 
companies or insurance intermediaries carrying out distribution activities to prevent 
the risk of detrimental impact.134 Inducement means any fee, commission, or any non-
monetary benefit provided by or to insurance distributors in connection with the 
distribution of an insurance-based investment product, to or by any party except the 
customer involved in the transaction in question or a person acting on behalf of that 
customer.135 Inducement scheme means a set of rules governing the payment of 
inducements, including the conditions under which the inducements are paid.136 
Identification of conflicts of interest: Under the IDD, insurance undertakings and 
intermediaries must ensure that they proceed in the same way on the identification of 
conflict of interest between a customer and another.137 
                                                        
133 Article 4(1) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359. 
134 Article 8(2) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359. 
135 Article 2(2) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359. 
136 Article 2(3) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359.  
137 Para. 2, Article 3(1) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359. 
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b. Additional information provided to customers: 
In addition to general information, insurance undertakings and intermediaries must 
provide to customers with additional information:138 
 A periodic assessment of the suitability of IBIPs when the IBIPs sold with an 
advice. The insurance distributors must ensure that the periodic report 
contains updated information, stating how the IBIPs meets the customer’s 
preferences, objectives, and other characteristics of customers.139 Insurance 
undertakings or intermediaries must review the suitability of the 
recommended IBIPs at least annually. This review can be done more 
frequently; however, it depends on the characteristic of customers and the 
nature of the recommended IBIPs.  
 The guidance on, and warnings of the risks associated with the IBIPs or in 
respect of particular investment strategies proposed.  
 The information concerning the cost of advice, where relevant, the cost of the 
IBIPs recommended or marketed to customers; how customers may pay for 
it, encompassing any third party payments. The information of all costs and 
charges in connection with the distribution of the IBIPs will be in an 
aggregated form. If customers request, insurance intermediaries or 
undertakings must provide an itemised breakdown of the cost and charges 
based regularly, at least annually, during the life cycle of the investment.140 
In addition, insurance undertakings and intermediaries must provide the customer 
with the following documents: 
 A record including documents agreed between an insurance intermediary or 
undertaking and customers that set out the rights and obligations of the 
                                                        
138 Article 29(1) of the IDD. 
139 Para. 6, Article 30(5) of the IDD.  
140 Article 29 of the IDD. 
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parties, and the other terms on which the intermediary or undertaking will 
provide services to the customer.141 The record will be retained in medium 
and the storage of information in an accessible way for future reference by 
the competent authority.142 
 Adequate reports on a durable medium including periodic communications 
to customers, the type and the complexity of IBIPs involved and the nature of 
the service provided, where applicable, the cost associated with the 
transaction, and service undertaken on behalf of customers.143 The periodic 
report shall be provided at least annually.144 
 A suitability statement on a durable medium before the conclusion of the 
contract in the case the advice is given. The suitability statement will specify 
the advice given and how that advice meets the preferences, objectives and 
other characteristics of the customer.145 Furthermore, when selling IBIPs 
with distance communication, the insurance undertakings or intermediaries 
must provide a suitability statement immediately after a customer is 
bounded by an insurance contract. They must ensure that the customer has 
consented to receive the suitability statement without undue delay after the 
conclusion of the contract and has been given the option of delaying the 
conclusion of the contract to receive the suitability statement in advance of 
such conclusion.146 
c. New requirements of assessment of suitability or appropriateness of IBIPs: 
Under the IDD, when selling IBIPs with a given advice, insurance undertakings or 
intermediaries must assess the suitability of IBIPs. However, in the case of non-advice 
they must assess the appropriateness of IBIPs. 
                                                        
141 Article 30(4) of the IDD. 
142 Article 19(4) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359.  
143 Para. 1, Article 30(5) of the IDD. 
144 Article 18(3) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359.  
145 Para. 2, Article 30(5) of the IDD. 
146 Para. 3, Article 30(5) of the IDD. 
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To assess the suitability of IBIPs, insurance undertakings or intermediaries must 
obtain information from customers and potential customers, including (i) customers’ 
knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of 
product or service; (ii) customers’ financial situation, particularly, the person's ability 
to bear losses; (iii) customers’ investment objectives, particularly, person’s risk 
tolerance.147 The insurance undertakings or intermediaries can determine the extent 
of the information to be collected from customers and potential customers.148 For 
group insurance, they must establish, implement and record policy for group 
insurance. The policy aims to determine who shall be subject to the assessment of the 
suitability of IBIPs. This policy also contains rules, stating how that assessment will be 
done in practice, whose information about knowledge, experience, financial situation 
and investment objectives shall be collected.  
Additionally, when gathering information from customers, insurance undertakings 
and intermediaries must ensure that they will (i) not create ambiguity or confusion 
about their responsibility in the process of assessing the suitability of IBIPs, and (ii) 
inform customers clearly and simply that the reason for assessing suitability is to 
enable them to act in the customer’s best interest.149 They also must ensure the 
reliability of the information that they collect from customers and potential customers 
for assessing the suitability of IBIPs.150 
When IBIPs sold without advice, insurance undertakings or intermediaries must 
assess the appropriateness of these products by asking customers their information 
regarding their knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the 
specific type of products and service offered or demanded. In addition, insurance 
undertakings or intermediaries must provide a standard form to warn the customers 
that the product is not appropriate. Furthermore, when the customers do not provide 
                                                        
147 Article 30(1) of the IDD. 
148  Article 9(1) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359. 
149 Article 11 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359. 
150 Article 10(1) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359.  
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their information or the information provided is insufficient, the insurance 
undertakings or intermediaries must warn the customers that they are not in a position 
to determine whether product envisaged is appropriate for them.151 However, 
insurance undertakings or intermediaries do not need to ask information from 
customers, and warn the inappropriateness of IBIPs to customers, if they meet the all 
following conditions: (i) the IBIPs are non-complex and not difficult for customers to 
understand; (ii) the insurance distribution activity is carried out at the initiative of the 
customers; (iii) the customers informed the insurance distributors are not required to 
assess the appropriateness of the IBIPs, and the insurance distributors comply with 
obligation on article 27 (Prevention of conflicts of interest) and Article 28 (Conflicts of 
interest).152  
3.7.5 Rules on cross-selling: 
According to article 24 of the IDD, cross-selling means that insurance products sold 
together with another product or service are not insurance and as a part of a package 
or the same agreement.  
There are two distinct cases of cross-selling. Firstly, it is an insurance product 
offered together with an ancillary product or service. Secondly, it is an insurance 
product that is ancillary with another product or service. In both cases, insurance 
distributors who practice cross-selling must inform or offer customers a possibility of 
buying different components separately. However, this rule is not applied in the case 
of an insurance product is ancillary to an investment service or activity153, a credit 
agreement154, or payment accounts155. Additionally, for the first case, when customers 
                                                        
151 Article 30(2) of the IDD. 
152 Article 30(3) of the IDD. 
153 As defined in point 2 of Article 4(1) of the MiFID II.  
154 As defined in Article 4(3) of Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
4 February 2014 on credit agreement for consumers relating to residential immovable property and 
amending Directive 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 
155 As defined in Article 2(3) of Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and 
access to payment accounts with basis features (hereinafter referred to as Payment Account Directive).  
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can buy the products separately, insurance distributors must provide customers with 
the following additional information: 
 An adequate description of the different components of the agreement or 
package, separate evidence of the costs and charges of each component; 
 In the case of a risk or an insurance coverage is resulting from such an 
agreement or package offered to customers is different from that associated 
with the components taken separately, the insurance distributor must provide 
an adequate description of the different components of the agreement or 
package and how their interaction modifies the risk or the insurance coverage. 
Furthermore, insurance distributors must specify the demands and needs of 
customers concerning insurance products. 
3.7.6 Oversight and governance insurance products: 
The IDD imposes rules on products’ oversight and governance (POG) that are 
applied to insurance undertakings or intermediaries who are (i) manufacturers of any 
insurance products; and (ii) distributors advising on, or proposing insurance products 
that they do not manufacture.156 According to that, manufacturers must operate and 
review a product approval process, whereas, distributors must establish and review 
insurance distribution arrangements.  
A product approval process must (i) be proportionate and appropriate to the nature 
of an insurance product, and (ii) specify an identified target market for each product.157 
The product approval process includes measures and procedures for designing, 
monitoring, reviewing, and distributing insurance products, as well as corrective 
actions for insurance products that are detrimental to customers. It must be set out in 
a written document and named as “product oversight and governance policy”. This 
policy is made available to manufacture’s body or structure that are responsible for the 
                                                        
156 Article 2 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2358. 
157 Article 25(1) of the IDD. 
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manufacturing of insurance products. To ensure that the process is still valid and up to 
date, manufacturers must regularly review their products’ approval process and 
amend the approval process where necessary. 
Product distribution arrangements must contain appropriate measures and 
procedures to obtain from manufacturers all appropriate information on insurance 
products that they intend to offer their customers, and to fully comprehend those 
insurance products. Therefore, manufacturers must make available all appropriate 
information on insurance products and the product approval process to insurance 
distributors who are not manufacturers. 158 The product distribution arrangements 
must be set out in a written document and available to the relevant staff of the 
insurance distributors. 
a. Designing: 
According to POG rules, the activity of designing of insurance products must include 
the activity of identifying target market and the activity of testing insurance products. 
In general, manufacturers must ensure that their designing of insurance product must 
(i) take into account the objectives, interests and characteristics of customers; (ii) not 
adversely affect customers; and (iii) prevent or mitigate customers’ detriment. This 
implies that manufacturers must focus on customer protection at the beginning of the 
life cycle of an insurance product.  
Target market: manufacturers must identify a target market at a sufficiently 
granular level and take into account the characteristics, risk profile, complexity, and 
the nature of insurance products. Manufaturers must ensure their staffs who are 
involved in the activity of designing and manufacturing of insurance products have 
necessary skills, knowledge, and expertise to properly understand insurance products. 
Additionally, they must ensure the interest, objectives and characteristics of customers 
                                                        
158 Article 25(1) of the IDD. 
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are belong to the target market. Manufacturers must use their identified target market 
to assess and test their insurance products. 
Product testing: the activity of testing insurance products aims to assess whether 
insurance products meet the identified needs, objectives, and characteristics of target 
market. Therefore, manufacturers must not design and bring insurance products to the 
market if insurance products are not compatible with the target market. Manufacturers 
must test insurance products in the following situations: (i) before bringing insurance 
products to the market, or (ii) significantly adapting insurance products, or (iii) the 
target market has significantly changed. Muanufacturers can test their products in a 
qualitative manner or in a quantitative manner. For the latter, it depends on the type 
and nature of an insurance product and the related risk of detriment to customers  
b.  Monitoring, reviewing and corrective actions: 
Manufacturers must monitor and review insurance products that they have brought 
to the market. Particularly, the manufacturers must identify (i) events that could 
materially affect the main features, and (ii) the risk coverage or the guarantees of an 
insurance product; and (iii) any circumstances related to insurance products that may 
adversely affect customers. Manufacturers must assess whether insurance products 
remain consistent with their identified target market, and if they are distributed to the 
target market or are reaching customers outside the target market.  
Monitoring: Manufacturers must continuously monitor insurance products. The 
activity of monitoring is a permanent process, and requires manufacturers to remain 
alerted to crucial events that would substantially affect the main features of insurance 
products. Therefore,  manufacturers should set up an alert system to define a process 
under which the insurance business units who monitor certain information will report 
to monitoring managers the occurrence of alert situations.159  
                                                        
159 Pierpaolo Marano (2019), The Product Oversight and Governance and Liabilities, in Distribution of 
Insurance-Based Investment Products: The EU Regulation and the Liabilities, Pierpaolo Marano, Ioannis 
Rokas (ed.), Springer, p.80,  
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 Reviewing: Manufacturers must review regularly their insurance products. 
Manufactures can determine appropriate intervals for their regular review. This is 
based on the nature of the products, and the target market, or events that could 
materially affect the potential risk to customers.160 This allows manufacturers to adjust 
the frequency of the review process to adapt with changes in timing of the internal 
design product, the size, scale, and complexity of the insurance undertaking and of the 
different products it manufacturers.161 According to the POG rules, manufacturers play 
a main role in the review process. However, insurance distributors must also 
coordinate with the manufacturers by means of providing them relevant sales 
information, and information on their regular reviews of the products distribution 
arrangements.162  
Corrective actions: After the monitoring and the review process, manufacturers 
must (i) take appropriate actions to mitigate circumstances that are related to 
insurance products and prevent further occurrences of the detrimental event; and (ii) 
inform promptly concerned insurance distributors and customers about the remedial 
action taken. Besides that, when insurance distributors become aware (i) an event that 
could materially affect the potential guarantees to the identified target market; or (ii) 
insurance products might cause detriment to customers, they must promptly inform 
with manufacturers.163 Manufacturers are free to decide steps, as well as specific 
appropriate actions to be taken to correct insurance products. 164  However, they must 
                                                        
160 EIOPA, Final Report on Consultation Paper no. 16/006 on Technical Advice on possible delegated acts 
concerning the Insurance Distribution Directive, p.41. 
161 Same Final Report, p.41. 
162 Article 10(6) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU), 2017/2358.  
163 Article 11 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2358.  
164 According to the Final Consultation Report no. 16/006, the appropriate actions could be the following 
(the list is not exhaustive): 
 the provision of any relevant information on the event and its consequences on the product to the 
customer, or the distributors of the product if the firm does not offer directly the product to the 
customer; 
 changing the product approval process; 
 changing the product; 
 proposing a new product to the customer; 
 changing the target market; 
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ensure their changes to insurance products that are consistent with the already 
existing market, and do not have an adverse impact on the customers to which the 
product has been sold already.165  
c. Distributing: 
Regarding POG’s requirements on distributing of insurance products, 
munufacturers must (i) select distribution channels that are appropriate with the 
identified target market; (ii) provide insurance distributors with all appropriate 
information; and (iii) monitor insurance distributors act in accordance with the 
objective of a product approval process, and take appropriate remedial actions when 
the distribution is not in accordance with the objective of their product approval 
process. To select the appropriate distribution channels, manufacturers must take into 
account the particular characteristics of the relevant insurance products.  
Manufacturers must ensure staffs of insurance distributors who must understand 
the characteristics of insurance products, and also have the appropriate skills to 
distribute the products correctly, such as employees of banks or  ancillary insurance 
intermediaries. The manufacturers must provide the insurance distributors with clear, 
complete and updated information on the insurance products, the identified target 
market and the suggested distribution strategy. Additionally, they need to coordinate 
with the insurance distributors to provide professional training for these staffs.  
For insurance distributors, their body or structure are responsible for insurance 
distribution will endorse and be ultimately responsible for establishing, implementing 
and reviewing product distribution arrangements and continuously verify internal 
compliance with those arrangements. They can determine the appropriate intervals for 
                                                        
 stopping further issuance of the product; 
 contacting the distributor to discuss a modification of the distribution process; 
 terminating the relationship with the distributor; 
 informing the relevant competent authority; or 
 informing the customer. 
165 EIOPA (February 2017), Final Report on Consultation Paper no. 16/006 on Technical Advice on 
possible delegated acts concerning the Insurance Distribution Directive, p.43. 
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the regular review of their product distribution arrangements and ensure that those 
arrangements are still valid and up to date. They must verify insurance products are 
distributed to the identified target market. Where appropriate, insurance distributors 
need to amend the product distribution arrangements.  
In addition, insurance distributors must ensure any specific distribution strategy 
must be in accordance with the distribution strategy of manufacturers of insurance 
products. Where appropriate, they need to amend their distribution strategy for the 
insurance products in the case that they become aware (i) insurance products are not 
in line with the interests, objectives and characteristics of their identified market or; 
(ii) other product-related circumstances that may adversely affect customers.  
3.7.7 The competence between the home and host Member State:  
The IDD splits the competence between regulators of host and home Member State 
on measuring any breaches of the IDD’s obligations when an insurance or ancillary 
insurance intermediary exercises its freedom to establish and provide services in the 
Community. In principle, any breach of the IDD that needs to be referred back to the 
competent authority of home Member State who must take responsibility to measure. 
Competent authorities of the host and home Member State must inform for each other 
of any such measures taken.166 
 Under the new IDD, the jurisdiction of the host Member State’s regulator can be 
granted. Specifically, when measures that are taken by home Member State are not 
enough, host Member State can take appropriate and stricter measures to prevent 
further irregularities and prevent the intermediaries from continuing to carry on new 
business with its territory. Additionally, the host Member State can act as the home 
Member State if the primary place of business of an insurance or ancillary insurance 
intermediary located in the host Member State other than its home Member State.167 
In this case, to ensure that insurance or ancillary insurance intermediaries comply with 
                                                        
166 Para. 2 and 3 of Article 5 (1) and Article 8(2,3) of the IDD. 
167 Article 7 of the IDD. 
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the obligations of the IDD, competent authorities of the host Member State have right 
to (i) examine establishment arrangements, (ii) request changes as are needed to 
enforce the obligation concerning information, conduct of business rules, the 
additional requirements concerning IBIPs, and (iii) measure adopted pursuant thereto 
concerning the services or activities provided the establishment within its territory.168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
4.1 The scope of the IDD:  
Under the IDD, banks are no longer considered as tied insurance intermediaries or 
ancillary insurance intermediaries. Therefore, banks must register their insurance 
distribution activities as insurance agents and comply fully the IDD’s requirements. 
Before the IDD, there are two options in which banks can become tied insurance 
intermediaries. The first option is defined for banks who carry out the activity of 
insurance mediation for and on behalf of one or more insurance undertakings. In this 
                                                        
168 Article 7(2) of the IDD.  
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context, they act under the full responsibility of those insurance undertakings for 
insurance products. Under the IDD, this kind of tied insurance intermediary is now 
must be registered as insurance agents.  
The second option is for banks who act under the responsibility of one or several 
insurance undertakings for insurance products. These insurance products are 
complementary to a good or a service supplied in the framework of the banks' principal 
professional activity. According to the IDD, this kind of tied insurance intermediaries 
must be considered as ancillary insurance intermediaries. However, according to the 
IDD, ancillary insurance intermediaries cannot be credit institutions. This means that 
the banks can carry out distributing insurance products based on an ancillary basis as 
insurance agents, and comply fully the IDD’s requirements.  
Before the IDD apllied, the IMD requires fewer responsibilities for banks than 
insurance agents. For example, banks do not need to comply with IMD's requirements 
on information and professional, and rules on conducts of business. Instead, insurance 
companies carrying on insurance business through banks, must ensure conditions for 
banks to comply with these IMD's requirements. Therefore, under the IDD, banks who 
have been registerd as tied insurance intermediaries might be affected than those who 
have been registered as insurance agents. Thus, banks registered as tied insurance 
intermediaries must adjust their activities in distributing insurance products in order 
to comply with the new requirements for insurance agents that are not compulsory 
under the IMD. These requirements include information requirements, the conduct of 
business requirements, and products oversight governance.  
4.2 The rule on cross-selling: 
According to the IDD, when banks offer an ancillary insurance product together with 
main product and service which are not an investment activity or service, a credit 
agreement, or a payment account, they must also give customers a choice to buy 
individual components separately. This means that customers can deny to buy the 
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ancillary insurance product if they found that is not necessary for their demands. For 
banks, this is the stricter requirement. It prevents bnaks to offer unnecessary and 
unwanted insurance products to their customers. In addition, to ensure that ancillary 
insurance products are appropriate with customers, banks must specify the demands 
and needs of customers in relation to insurance products that form a part of the overall 
package or the same agreement. This implies that banks must respect the customer’s 
choice and understand their customers’ demands and needs better rather than merely 
focussing on sales of insurance products, and commission obtained from insurance 
companies. 
4.3 The professional and organisation requirements: 
Prior to the IDD, insurance companies who cooperate with banks to sell insuranc 
products verify the knowledge and ability of banks concerning insurance products.169 
In addition, if necessary, the insurance companies can provide the banks a training 
service to help banks to have appropriate knowledge and ability concerning insurance 
products.  
However, under the IDD, banks now must comply with stricter and more specific 
professional requirements. Specifically, banks must ensure their employees have at 
least 15 hours of training about insurance products and insurance distribution per 
year. The contents of the training should include the nature of insurance products, the 
type of insurance intermediaries of banks, the role of the employees, and the activity 
carried out within the banks. Regarding the format of the training, the IDD does not 
provide any specific requirements; and therefore, it can be flexible and adaptable 
including course, e-learning or mentoring.170 The successful completion of the training 
and development requirements can be proven by obtaining a certificate. The IDD does 
not stipulate the particular roles of insurance undertakings on conducting the 
                                                        
169 Para 3 of Article 4(1) of the IMD. 
170 Nic De Maesschalck (2017), The Insurance Distribution Directive: What does it change for 
intermediaries and for others?  in Insurance Regulation in the European Union: Solvency II and Beyond, 
p. 67.  
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continuing professional training for employees of insurance intermediaries. Therefore, 
banks and insurance companies are free to discuss and manage their particular roles 
in conducting the training according to their agreement. 
The continuing professional training requirements might increase the operational 
costs for banks. As a  consequence, this might increase the cost of insurance products 
through fees or taxes.171 Furthermore, banks need to arrange actively their specific role 
in conducting the training and coordinate with insurance companies to train their 
employees effectively.  
4.4 The information duties and conducts of business requirements: 
According to the new IDD, banks must provide customers information on insurance 
products, an insurance contract, and information on banks and insurers. Compared 
with the IMD, banks must provide customers more information. Especially, banks now 
must provide customers the nature of any fees and benefits paid by the third party, as 
well as the working basis of insurance contracts. Besides that, they must ensure their 
the information that be provided  through durable medium or websites must comply 
with the new conditions of the IDD.  
In addition, depending on the types of insurance products and the insurance 
distribution with or without advice, the information provided to customers can be 
different. For instance, in the case of sale with advice, banks must provide customers a 
personalised recommendation explaining why insurance products would best meet 
the customer’s demands and needs. If insurance products are IBIPs, banks must 
provide customers a suitability statement, a periodic assessment of the suitability of 
IBIPs, records, and reports concerning IBIPs. Therefore, before concluding any 
                                                        
171 Annette Hofmann, Julia K. Neumann, and David Pooser (2018), Plea for Uniform Regulation and 
Challenges of Implementing the New Insurance Distribution Directive, The Geneva Papers, 43, 740-769, p. 
765. 
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insurance contract, banks must inform customers whether or not they will be received 
an advice during the sale of insurance products.  
Furthermore, banks must provide customers a document about the insurance 
products that include the relevant information concerning the complexity of insurance 
products and type of customers. Especially, when distributing non-life insurance 
products, banks must provide customers another document that must be drawn up by 
manufacturers.  
To ensure that the recommended insurance products are appropriate with 
customers, banks need to specify the demands and needs of the customers for each 
specific insurance product. This requirement applies to all types of insurance products, 
all types of insurance distributors, as well as to cross-sell, sale with or without the 
advice that were mentioned in the IMD. However, the IDD requires more than that. 
That is, when selling IBIPs, banks must conduct the assessment of the suitability or 
appropriateness of IBIPs. Additionally, when gathering necessary information from 
customers to assess the suitability of IBIPs, banks also need to comply with the 
additional requirements that mentioned in Section 3.7.4 (b). Therefore, banks need to 
determine exactly necessary information that they must provide to their customers to 
ensure that customers are not overloaded by unnecessary information.  
Regarding the conduct of business requirements concerning IBIPs, banks now must 
comply with more requirements such as establishing the conflicts of interest policy; 
and assessing inducement or inducement scheme to prevent the conflicts of interest of 
customers. These requirements are new for banks.  
4.5 Product oversight and governance:  
POG rules apply to the entire life cycle of all types of insurance products regardless 
life or non-life insurance products. Banks must comply with the POG rules when they 
are distributors or co-manufacturers of an insurance product.  
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For banks who are distributors of insurance products, they must establish, regularly 
review product distribution arrangements, and keep informing promptly with 
manufacturers to ensure that their distribution strategy is in line with the target 
market of manufacturers and the benefits of customers. Especially, banks need to 
collaborate with manufacturers to review insurance products. Specifically, they must 
provide the manufacturers the necessary information concerning insurance products 
whenever the manufacturers require.  
In the case that both banks and insurance companies are manufacturers of 
insurance products, banks are considered as co-manufacturers and must comply with 
POG’s requirements for manufacturers. However, particular requirements for banks 
depend on an agreement between the banks and the insurance companies.  
Because of the POG’s rules for manufacturers banks are now under a pressure to 
change their strategy in conducting insurance busssines. That is, since now banks must 
focus on real values that those products bring to their customers rather than focusing 
only on values for their shareholders, directors and senior managers.172 Besides that, 
the POG might create additional costs in manifaturing insurance products as both 
banks and insurance companies must set up an adequate POG process and adjust their 
IT systems. The additional cost might be taken into account in the pricing of their 
insurance products. As a result, insurance products might become more expensive for 
customers.173  
 
                                                        
172 Pierpaolo Marano (2019), The Product Oversight and Governance Standards and Liabilities, in 
Distribution of Insurance-based Investment Products-The EU Regulation and the Liabilities, P. Marano, 
I. Rokas (ed.), p. 66. 
173 Thomas Kohne and Christoph Brommelmeyer (2018), The new Insurance Distribution Regulation in 
the EU – A critical assessment from a legal and economic perspective, The Geneva Papers, 43, p. 726. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation presented a comprehensive study of bancassurance in Europe and 
possible impacts of the new EU Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) on the 
bancassurance activities.  
Banks and insurance companies can cooperate to conduct insurance business under 
many different bancassurance models. The difference between the models relies on the 
integration level of banking and insurance activities. However, in general, all models 
have a common characteristic, that is, insurance companies are in charge of designing 
insurance products, while banks are responsible for selling insurance products. In 
return, insurance companies pay back commissions to banks. 
The new IDD aims to give more protection to insurance customers. Specifically, the 
Directive provides stricter and more standardised requirements than the IMD. The 
scope of the IDD covers all types of insurance distributors. The IDD regulates not only 
the distribution activities but also the manufacturing activities of insurance products. 
The new IDD implies that banks, ancillary insurance intermediaries, other insurance 
intermediaries, and manufacturers must ensure that their insurance products meet the 
best of customers’ benefits. Furthermore,  insurance distribution activities must be 
able to prevent and mitigate the conflicts of interest that are detrimental to customers.  
According to the new IDD, it can be concluded that there is no longer different 
between banks and other insurance intermediaries. This, because under the new IDD, 
banks must register their insurance distribution as insurance intermediaries. In 
comparison with the previous requirements of the IMD, we found that the IDD tightens 
the activities of insurance distribution of banks through prohibiting banks to become 
tied or ancillary insurance intermediaries and providing stricter requirements that 
banks must comply with. For instance, banks must disclose more information 
concerning conflicts of interest and transparency to their customers, must conduct 
annually professional training for their employees, and comply with stricter rules on 
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cross-selling, as well as rules on insurance product oversight and governance. Besides, 
for banks who distribute IBIPs, they must comply with the additional requirements 
relating to IBIPs.  
However, so far, we found no study or particular complaints from banks stating that 
the new IDD places more difficulties and barriers in distributing insurance products to 
customers. This might be due to the fact that the new IDD has only been applying for 
two years (since 2018), thus, it might take more time to have a full assessment.  
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